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ABSTRACT 
 The transparency and openness of the monetary policymaking process at the 
Bank of England has provided very detailed information on both the decisions of 
individual members of the Monetary Policy Committee and the information on which 
they are based. In this paper we consider this decision making process in the context 
of a model in which inflation forecast targeting is used but there is heterogeneity 
among the members of the committee. We find that internally generated forecasts of 
output and market generated expectations of medium term inflation provide the best 
description of discrete changes in interest rates. We also find a role for asset prices 
through the equity market, foreign exchange market and housing prices. There are 
also identifiable forms of heterogeneity among members of the committee that 
improves the predictability of interest rate changes. This can be thought of as 
supporting the argument that full transparency of monetary policy decision making 
can be welfare enhancing.  
 
JEL Classification: E420, E430, E500. 
Keywords: Monetary policy; interest rates; monetary policy committee; committee 
decision making. 
 
CASTLECLIFFE, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS, KY16 9AL 
TEL: +44 (0)1334 462445    FAX: +44 (0)1334 462444    EMAIL: AWT2@ST-AND.AC.UK 
WWW.ST-ANDREWS.AC.UK/ECONOMICS/CDMA/CDMA.SHTML 
1 Introduction
The widely recognised transparency and openness of the monetary policy-
making process at the Bank of England has provided very detailed infor-
mation on both the decisions of individual members of the Monetary Policy
Committee and the information on which they are based. Recent literature
has used such detailed information, including votes by individual policymak-
ers, to study several aspects of monetary policymaking in the Bank of Eng-
land1. In this paper we consider this decision making process in the context
of a model in which inflation forecast targeting is used but there is hetero-
geneity among the members of the committee. This heterogeneity does not
arise so much from differences in preferences about inflation and output, as
from the differences in information assimilation.
Our paper touches on a number of issues in the literature on monetary
policy. There is a large literature on the usefulness of trying to characterise
monetary policy in terms of a rule. More recently, Orphanides (2003) has
provided a historical analysis and has been able to show that there is a
degree of consistency in the conduct of US monetary policy during the 1920s
and since the 1951 accord that gave effective independence to the Federal
Reserve. In many cases across the world, the Taylor rule provides a useful
way of analysing policy.
However, another theme running through much of the policy discussion
has concerned the potential use of simple monetary rules such as those advo-
cated by Taylor (1993). To some extent the use of a simple rule assumes the
sort of well defined preferences which are conspicuously absent in the current
monetary arrangement. However, simple rules have a number of advantages
chiefly, perhaps, by making the operation of monetary policy transparent
and therefore easily monitored by the private sector. The question remains
as to what form such a simple rule should take. Taylor conditions short
term interest rates on current deviations of output and inflation from target
while Svensson (1997a, 1997b) argues that, given the long and variable lags
inherent in policy, it might make more sense to target a forecast of inflation
rather than its current value. Orphanides (1998) has also pointed out that
decisions about interest rates are made in real time when there is consider-
1See, for example, Chadha and Nolan (2001), Cobham (2002a, 2002b, 2003) and
Gerlach-Kristen (2004). There is also a substantial literature in the US which uses in-
formation provided by transcripts of the proceedings of the FOMC. See Belden (1989),
Havrilesky and Gildea (1991), Edison and Marquez (1998) and Chappell et al. (2004).
2
able uncertainty about the current state of the economy. In this paper we
assume that the filtering which is required of current (imperfect) measure of
economic activity takes place as part of the internal procedures of the Bank
of England (see Budd (1998) for a description).
In this paper we take advantage of the considerable volume of informa-
tion that the Bank of England makes available about the decision-making
processes of the Monetary Policy Committee to examine the kinds of policy
rule that the MPC operates implicitly. As has been emphasised repeatedly
by a number of commentators, it is clear that the Bank operates an inflation
forecast type of rule, but with some evidence to suggest that developments
in asset markets also matter (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001; Cobham, 2002a).
The contrast between the degree of transparency that the Bank of Eng-
land aspires to and the traditional practices of Central Bankers could not be
greater2. Transparency serves the need of accountability but it also improves
predictability. Previous research has argued that dissenting votes can be
attributed to policy-makers’ possibly different policy preferences. Further,
these dissents may contain information about uncertainty in the macroeco-
nomic environment3. We find in this paper that explicit modeling of the
individual decisions of MPC members improves the predictability of interest
rate changes compared with the case where only the aggregate decision is
known. The heterogeneity across the MPC is valuable information. This
throws some light on the current debate about the extent to which central
banks should make decision making processes as transparent as possible4.
The granting of operational independence to the Bank of England in 1997
put in place a mechanism for making decisions on monetary policy based on
a 9 member Monetary Policy Committee made of 5 internal and 4 exter-
nal members. Operational decisions on interest rate policy are made by the
MPC. It comprises the Governor of the Bank of England, the two deputy
Governors, two members of the Bank with responsibility in the Bank for
monetary policy and market operations and four outside members with rele-
2See Chadha and Nolan (2001) for an early analysis of the post-1997 policy regime.
3See, for example, Belden’s (1989) analysis of dissents in FOMC votes and Chadha and
Nolan’s (2001) analysis in the UK context. Other measures of uncertainty discussed in the
literature include forecast revisions (Chadha and Nolan, 2001) and dispersion in survey
correspondents’ views on inflation (Bomberger, 1996).
4See Geraats (2002) for an extensive survey of the question of transparency in monetary
policymaking, and Gerlach-Kristen (2004) for a recent empirical analysis of predictability
in MPC decision-making.
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vant expertise who are appointed by the Chancellor. The internal members
are permanent appointments while the externals serve for a 3 year period,
with the possibility of reappointment. A large amount of information is pro-
vided on both the information set that is at the disposal of the Committee
and the eventual vote that each member casts. This provides an invaluable
dataset to study what is actually the basis for decisions on interest rates. We
find that the decision making process is best thought of as an inflation fore-
cast regime5 (Svensson, 1997a) but with some responsiveness to asset market
developments. This suggests that the common approach of conditioning in-
terest rates on current and lagged output and inflation may be misplaced.
There is now an extensive literature on the role that asset market devel-
opments should play in monetary policy decisions. For example, Bernanke
and Gertler (2001) argue that policy should not respond to changes in assets
prices, except in so far as they signal changes in expected inflation. Cecchetti
et al. (2000), by contrast, have argued that monetary policy should respond
to bubbles or misalignments in asset prices.6
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly discuss some
simple models of the inflation process and introduce a role for transparency
and for a committee structure for decision-making and consider the signal
extraction problem that the MPC and the members individually face. In
Section 3 we discuss the estimation problem. In section 4 we report some
empirical results. Finally, in section 5, we present our conclusions.
2 Models of the inflation process
We adopt the most simple form of a model of the monetary policymaking
process and abstract from many issues that have been the focus of much of
5It should be emphasised that since the inception of inflation targetting at the Bank of
England, officials have always described their actions as been conditioned on what inflation
is expected to be in the future, since the delays in the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy means nothing can be done about the current rate of inflation.
6For other views see Vickers (1999), Goodhart (2001), Bean (2003) and Bullard and
Schalling (2002).
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the recent literature7. The model is structured as follows:
πt = πt−1 + αyt−1 + t (1)
yt = β1yt−1 − β2(it−1 − πt−1) + ηt (2)
πt is the inflation rate in period t, yt is the output gap (the difference
between the log of output and the log of potential output), it is the nominal
interest rate. ηt and εt are iid shocks in period t not observable in period
t− 1. The coefficients α and β2 are positive; β1 (0 < β1 < 1) measures the
degree of persistence in the output gap. The output gap depends negatively
on the real lagged interest rate. The change in inflation depends on the
lagged output gap. The output gap is normalised to zero in the long run.
These pure delays in the impact of the output gap on inflation and of
interest rates on the output gap captures in the most straightforward way
the central bankers’ stylised model of the monetary transmission process.
The modern generation of New Keynesian models with nominal inertia and
imperfect competition still exhibit jumps in output and inflation in response
to shocks8 which will blur the pure delays embodied in equations (1) and (2).
The intertemporal loss function is:
Lt =
1
2
Et
X
τ=t
δτ−t
£
(πt − π∗)2
¤
+ λy2t (3)
Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in period t.
π∗ is the inflation target; δ, is the discount rate and satisfies 0 < δ < 1. The
policymaker minimises the present discounted value of squared deviations of
inflation from its target and the output gap. λ is the weight the policymaker
attaches to the output gap being zero, with the weight on inflation normalised
to one.
For the special case of λ = 0, so the policymaker only targets inflation,
the central bank can (in expectation) use the current interest rate to hit the
target for inflation two periods hence. So perfect controllability in this case
allows the intertemporal problem to be written as a sequence of single period
problems. In this case (Svensson, 1997a)
7In particular, for expositional purposes we ignore forward-looking expectations and
issues arising consequently from time inconsistency.
8See Corrado and Holly (2004) for an example in which inertia comes partly from habit
persistence in household consumption.
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Lt =
1
2
£
πt+2|t − π∗
¤2
(4)
πt+2|t is the forecast of inflation at time period t+2 based on information
available in period t. The central bank minimises the squared deviation of
the current two-year inflation forecast, πt+2|t, from the target. The forecast
of πt+2 at t is
πt+2|t = πt+1|t + αyt+1|t (5)
and
yt+1|t = β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t) (6)
where the subscript t|t indicates that current realisations of the output
gap and inflation may well be imperfectly observed, and need to be forecasted.
So:
πt+2|t = α
£
β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t)
¤
(7)
Then the inflation ‘feed forward’ rule is
it = (πt|t − π∗) +
1
αβ2
πt+1|t +
β1
β2
yt|t (8)
This satisfies the Taylor Principle since ∂i/∂π > 1, as long as there is
persistence in inflation. Although there is not an explicit weight attached
to output losses, current (forecasted) output appears in the rule because
the current output gap is informative about future inflation. In Svensson’s
original formulation πt|t and yt|t are known. In practice, as Orphanides (1998)
has pointed out, in real time current inflation and the current output gap
are not observed.
2.1 Committee decision-making
In contrast to the Federal Reserve9 and the ECB, where decision making
is by ‘consensus’, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England
9See Edison and Marquez (1998) for a detailed description of the decision making
processes of the Federal Open Markets Committee.
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uses majority voting so it is the median vote that decides the outcome for
monetary policy. One way to model decision making by committee is to
assume that preferences with respect to inflation and output vary across the
committee (Sibert, 2003; Neuman, 2002). In this case we can write a loss
function for the ith committee member as:
Lit =
1
2
Et
X
τ=t
δτ−t
£
(πt − π∗)2
¤
+ λiy2t , for i = 1, ...,m (9)
If we confine ourselves to the case considered earlier when only inflation
matters, preference heterogeneity is not meaningful. Instead we adopt the
alternative approach in which heterogeneity arises from differing views about
the state of the economy10. Each member has the same (public) information
set but will augment this with private information. This can take different
forms. An individual member may dissent from the consensus forecast or an
individual member may have particular expertise that leads to more weight
being attached to particular kinds of information compared to the average.
Since the internal dynamics of committee decision making can result in a
measure of sharing of expertise, we shall assume that each decision is ulti-
mately based on information that cannot be shared fully with the MPC, or
to which the other members of the Committee do not attach importance.
The decision rule for the ith member is:
iit = (πt|t − π∗) +
1
αβ2
πt+1|t +
β1
β2
yt|t + ς it for i = 1, ...,m (10)
ς it need not be a zero mean process. There are two main forms of hetero-
geneity. First, members may differ, for example, about the size of the output
gap. Some members may believe that the central estimate of the output gap
generated by the staff of the Bank of England underestimates improvements
on the supply side that widens the output gap and places less pressure on
inflation. In these circumstances a member may prefer on average a lower
interest rate. This we capture by the fixed effect, ς it, that (in absolute value)
10As King (2002) has pointed out, most of the discussion that takes place among the
MPC members is focused on a technical economic judgment about what it is necessary
to do to hit the inflation target. A sense of this process can be got from the summary of
discussions in each MPC meeting discussed in Cobham (2003). Chadha and Nolan (2001)
examine whether the perceived variation in preferences across MPC members (as revealed
in their votes) is related to volatility in interest rates.
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is increasing in the forecast standard deviation of output gap. However, we
assume that there are zero covariances among the ς it. In other words, this
assumes that the common information set across all members of the MPC
spans the common information between any pair of members, though not
necessarily the private information of each MPC member.
Secondly, views may differ about the effect of interest rates on output and
inflation. Suppose, for example, a member of the Committee believes that the
effect of interest rates on the output gap captured by β2, is actually smaller
than the central estimate. In this case interest rate setting will need to be
more variable in response to shocks to output and inflation. This member will
vote for more changes in interest rates, both positive and negative, compared
to the average. We interpret this as the actions of an activist member11.
2.2 Information Processing
The problem of determining yt|t and πt+1|t (and implicitly the uncertainty
associated with the forecasts) can be cast as an optimal filtering or signal
extraction problem (Holly and Hughes Hallett, 1989). Define the state vectoreyt = (πt, yt)0. So thateyt = Aeyt−1 +But + et (11)
where eyt is a 2× 1 vector, A a 2× 2 matrix, B is 2× 1 vector and ut = it.
et is a 2 × 1 vector of iid shocks. We assume that we observe the current
state of the economy imperfectly so
zt = Heyt + ψt, (12)
where E(ψt) = 0 and E(ψ
0
tψt) = Γt and zt is a 2× 1vector of observations of
the state vector. We want the best estimate of eyt conditional on information
available, which is eyt|t.
Prior knowledge of the conditional density of eyt−1 based on the informa-
tion set Ωt gives
E(eyt−1 | Ωt) = eyt−1|t (13)
11In the empirical analysis presented later in the paper, we segregate these two sources of
heterogeneity from one another. The first source of heterogeneity is related to uncertainty
about forecasts of output gap, which can be measured from the fan charts of output growth
published by the Bank of England. The second source of heterogeneity is related to the
level of activism of a particular member, and can be identified from the residuals of a
regression model in which the first source of heterogeneity has been controlled for.
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and
E(eyt | Ωt) = Aeyt−1|t +But. (14)
The conditional covariance of eyt−1|t is defined as
Cov(eyt−1 | Ωt) = Λt−1 (15)
so
Cov(eyt | Ωt) = AΛt−1A0 + Γt = Λt (16)
In this framework the time varying quality and reliability of information
is captured by Γt. The solution to this problem provides a way of optimally
updating estimates of eyt.
eyt|t = eyt|t−1 + Ft(zt −Heyt|t−1) (17)
where Ft = ΛtH 0(HΛtH 0 + Γt)−1.
So the best estimate is a linear combination of the previous best estimate
and on a correction for the difference between the previous estimate and the
latest observations.
The central point from the perspective of monetary control is that the
usefulness of new observations on the economy varies over time. In some
periods with a large Γt, there will be little if any revisions to the optimal
estimate of eyt|t, so a change in the interest rate setting will not take place12.
We assume that this multivariate filtering is the domain of the Bank of
England and the MPC. However, we can also allow for individual members
of the MPC to optimally update their private forecasts. Assume that ς it for
each member follows an autoregressive process.
ς it = κi + θiς it−1 + γit, 0 < θi < 1. (18)
γit v N(0, σ2γt) (19)
and we observe this via
12It may also be that interest rate setting by the MPC is affected by the frequency with
which the central forecasts of the Bank of England are updated. The Inflation Report is
published 4 times a year in February, May, August and November.
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zit = ς it + δit (20)
with δit v N(0, σ2δit) (21)
Where now z is a scalar. Then the optimal private estimate for the i’th
committee member is
ς it|t = ς it|t−1 + [σ2γit/(σ
2
γit
+ σ2δit)(zt − ς it|t−1)] (22)
Again the revisions to private information will vary with the quality of
observations.
The standard separation of observation from control means that these
optimal estimates of eyt|t and ς it|t can be plugged into the feedback rule given
in equation (10)13. Note, however, that whereas the form of the feedback rule
is independent of the observation process, the actual interest rate decision is
not. This will be affected by the quality and reliability of the information
that flows into the monetary decision making process.
3 Data and Econometric models
3.1 The information set and measurement of variables
In this section we turn to an empirical examination of monetary policy in the
UK. In the previous section the model suggested that an inflation forecast
rule has been used and we attempt to test for this using information provided
regularly by the Bank of England in the Inflation Report. We collected
information on the kinds of data that the MPC looked at for each monthly
meeting. Not all of this information is made use of in this paper but the
important thing was to ensure that we conditioned only on what information
was actually available at the time of each meeting.
Our dependent variable is the change in base rate agreed by the MPC at
each of its meetings, from June 1997 to December 2003; these meetings are
monthly and held in the first week of each month, except September 2001
when an additional meeting was held following the events on September 11.
13This separation also carries over to a more general model in which expectations are
forward looking (Pearlman, 1992).
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Our study of heterogeneity among the members of the MPC is based on deci-
sions of the individual members. The source for these data are the minutes of
the MPC meetings. We evaluate our models using data on monthly meetings
in 2004.
Assessing monetary policy decisions in the presence of uncertainty about
forecast levels of inflation and the output gap (including uncertainty both
in forecast output levels and perception about potential output) requires
collection of real-time data available to the policymakers when interest rate
decisions are made as well as measures of forecast uncertainty. This contrasts
with many studies of monetary policy which are based on realised (and subse-
quently revised) measures of economic activity (see Orphanides, 2003). The
extent to which there is uncertainty about the forecast of the Bank of Eng-
land can be inferred from the fan charts published in the Inflation Report
(Britton et al., 1998).
We also collected information on unemployment (where this typically
refers to unemployment three months prior to the MPC meeting, as well
data on the underlying state of asset markets (housing prices, share prices and
exchange rates). We measure unemployment by the year-on-year change in
ILO rate of unemployment, lagged 3 months. The ILO rate of unemployment
is computed using 3 months rolling average estimates of the number of ILO-
unemployed persons and size of labour force (ILO definition), both collected
from the ONS Labour Force Survey. Housing prices are measured by the
year-on-year growth rates of the Nationwide housing prices index (seasonally
adjusted) for the previous month (Source: Nationwide). Share prices and
exchange rates are measured by the year-on-year growth rate of the FTSE
100 share index and the effective exchange rate respectively at the end of the
previous month (Source: Bank of England). The other current information
included in the model is the current level of inflation; this is measured by the
year-on-year growth rate of RPIX headline inflation lagged 2 months (Source:
ONS).
Our model also includes expected rates of future inflation and forecasts
of current and future output. One difficulty with using the Bank’s forecasts
of inflation is that they are not really informative. By definition, the Bank
targets inflation over a two year horizon, so it always publishes a forecast
in which (in expectation) inflation hits the target in two years time. To
do anything else would be internally inconsistent. Instead, as a measure
of future inflation, we use the 4 year ahead inflation expectations implicit in
bond markets at the time of the MPC meeting, data on which can be inferred
11
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Figure 1: Variation in forecast output growth and its variance over time
from the Bank of England’s forward yield curve estimates obtained from
index linked bonds. For output, we use the Bank of England’s model based
mean quarterly forecasts of current and one-year-ahead GDP. As a measure
of forecast uncertainty, we use the standard deviation of the one-year-ahead
forecast. These measures are obtained from the Bank of England’s fan charts
of output; details regarding these measures are discussed elsewhere (Britton
et al., 1998). The forecasts of one-year-ahead output growth and its variance
show substantial variation over time (Figure 1).
3.2 An interval censoring model of base rate changes
Interest rate changes are highly clustered, with a majority of the meetings
proposing no change in the base rate (see Figure 2). For the Bank of Eng-
land MPC over the period of our analysis, 69 per cent of the meetings de-
cided to keep the base rate at its current level, 12 per cent recommended
a rise of 25 basis points, 14 per cent recommended a reduction of 25 ba-
sis points, and 5 per cent a reduction of 0.50 per cent. This clustering has
to be taken into account when studying decisions of the MPC. We do not
observe changes in interest rates on a continuous or unrestricted scale, we
have a non-continuous or limited dependent variable. Moreover, changes in
interest rates are in multiples of 25 basis points. So, in this paper, we use
an interval regression framework for analysis; other authors have used other
limited dependent variable frameworks, like the logit/ probit or multinomial
logit/ probit framework (for recent contributions, see Chevapatrakul et al.,
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Figure 2: Discrete (Limited Dependent) nature of interest rate changes
2001, and Gascoigne and Turner, 2003). Our choice of model is based on
the need to use all the information that is available when monetary policy
decisions are made, as well as problems relating to model specification and
interpretation of multinomial logit models (Greene, 1993). We also explored
a multinomial logit formulation, and found the broad empirical conclusions
to be similar.
The interval regression model (Amemiya, 1973) is a generalisation of the
tobit model where the truncation in the dependent variable is possibly dif-
ferent for different observation units, and the truncation cut-offs are known.
The observed dependent variable in our case,4rt,obs, is the truncated version
of the latent monetary policy response variable, 4rt, where
4rt,obs = −0.5 if 4rt ∈ (−∞,−0.375)
= −0.25 if 4rt ∈ [−0.375,−0.20)
= 0 if 4rt ∈ [−0.20, 0.20]
= 0.25 if 4rt ∈ (0.20, 0.375]
= 0.5 if 4rt ∈ (0.375,∞)
The wider truncation interval when interest rates are maintained (ie., for
4rt,obs = 0) may be interpreted as reflecting the conservative stance of mon-
etary policy under uncertainty with a bias in favour of leaving interest rates
unchanged.
Under this observation scheme, we estimate the following model of MPC
13
inflation targeting:
4rt = α+ βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t (23)
+βσ.σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
+ λ/.Zt−1 + εt,
where Zt−1 represents current observations on unemployment (4ut) and the
underlying state of asset markets (Phsg,t, PFTSE,t and Pexch,t). σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
is the
standard deviation of the one-year ahead forecast of output growth; this term
is included to incorporate the notion that the stance of monetary policy may
depend on the uncertainty relating to forecast future levels of output and
inflation. As was shown in the previous section, increased uncertainty about
the current state of the economy will tend to bias policy towards caution in
changing interest rates. In particular, this strand of the literature suggests
that optimal monetary policy may be more cautious (rather than activist)
under greater uncertainty in the forecast or real-time estimates of output gap
and inflation (see Issing, 2002; Aoki, 2003; and Orphanides, 2003). Since,
as previously discussed the published inflation forecast is not informative,
we confined ourselves to uncertainty relating to forecasts of future output
growth.
3.3 Fixed effects model of base rate changes with het-
erogeneity among members
Each member of the MPC arrives at his/ her own decision regarding interest
rates, and consensus interest rate decisions are arrived at by voting on these
individual proposals. In addition to consensus decisions, the Bank of England
also publishes interest rate change proposals of each individual member of
the MPC. The voting pattern of individual members of the MPC suggests
substantial systematic differences across the committee (Table 1)14. These
14For example, of the 37 meetings which Allsopp attended, the votes for 11 were against
the consensus decision, and all of these were for a lower interest rate. Similarly, Julius
voted against the consensus motion in 14 of the 45 meetings; all of these in favour of a
lower interest rate. Wadhwani disagreed 13 out of 37 times, each time in favour of a lower
interest rate. On the other hand, King disagreed with the consensus decision in 12 of
the 82 meetings he attended, voting for a higher interest rate each time. Buiter dissented
in 17 meetings out of 36, voting on 8 ocassions for a lower interest rate and 9 times in
favour of a higher one. Nickell favoured a different interest rate decision in 10 of the 49
meetings; 6 for a lower interest rate and 4 for a higher interest rate. See also King (2002)
and Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
14
data on individual votes offers the opportunity to examine the voting pattern
in MPC meetings, and resulting majority decision that is arrived at as a
consequence.
In the model of section 2 we have suggested that uncertainty about fore-
casts will affect monetary policy decisions. Moreover, that there will be
heterogeneity in the way individual members incorporate this uncertainty
about future levels of output (or different notions about full employment
level of future output) into their decisions. This appears to justify a model
of individual MPC members’ decisions, where there may be heterogeneity in
the effect that σ (yt) has on the interest rate decisions (ie., the coefficient
βσ).
TABLE 1: Heterogeneity among members:
Voting records of selected MPC members
Member Meetings Votes Dissent
Lower No change Raise Total High Low
Allsopp 37 18 19 0 11 0 11
Barker 37 9 24 4 4 1 3
Bean 45 10 32 3 1 0 1
Buiter 36 10 10 16 17 9 8
George 74 15 51 8 0 0 0
Goodhart 36 7 18 11 3 3 0
Julius 45 18 25 2 14 0 14
King 85 14 50 21 12 12 0
Nickell 49 15 27 7 10 4 6
Wadhwani 37 16 18 3 13 0 13
Under a similar interval regression framework as above, we would then
have the model:
4rit = α+ βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
+ λ/.Zt−1 + εit, (24)
where I [i ∈MPCt] is the indicator that member i was present at the MPC
meeting on date t, βσi represents the responsiveness of member i’s deci-
sion to uncertainty in future output, and πt+4|t and yt+1|t denote the ex-
pected/ forecasted value for inflation and output. The latent variables 4rit
are assigned to intervals in the same way as earlier. However, here there
are occasions when individuals MPC members have voted for a reduction
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of 40 or 75 basis points, or an increase of 50 basis points, hence all votes
for change of more than 25 basis points have been assigned to the intervals
[∆rit,obs − 0.125,∆rit,obs + 0.125).
3.4 Random effects models of base rate changes with
heterogeneity among members
The above fixed effects formulation, however, cannot capture one important
aspect of the heterogeneity in the decision processes of MPC members —
namely, the degree of activism. As noted earlier, some MPC members’ deci-
sions are characterized by a greater degree of variability than some others’15.
A convenient way of modeling the decision processes of MPC members that
captures such features would be through a random effects model; the response
of a more activist member would be characterised by a higher variance of the
effect of σ (yt).
A typical application of random effects in this context would have been
through the model
4rit = α+ βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt
+βy1.yt+1|t + λ
/.Zt−1 + uit,
where
uit = βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
+ εit,
βσi v N (µi, σ2i ) , εit v N (0, σ2) , εit and βσi independently distributed. How-
ever, this model is not identifiable. One can only work with this model if
σ2 = 0, which is not satisfactory.
15Buiter and Nickell are prominent examples (Table 1). Both have disagreed from the
consensus interest rate decisions at a substantial number of meetings, but their proposals
have not been predominantly above or below the consensus decision.
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An alternative random effects model may be the following:
4rit = α+ βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+λ/.Zt−1 + (β
∗
σ + βσi) .I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
,µ
β∗σ
βσi
¶
v N
∙µ
µ
µi
¶
,
µ
σ2 σ0i
σ0i σ2i
¶¸
, (25)
0 = nµ+
IX
i=1
niµi,
βσi’s are independent of each other,
where β∗σ represents the typical response of monetary policy to uncertainty,
βσi is the response of the specific MPC member
16, and n and ni’s are the
total number of meetings, and the number of meetings that member i attends
respectively. Recall the discussion in the previous regarding the two sources
of heterogeneity. This model allows the segregation of the uncertainty term
into these two parts, one that is common to all members (depending only
on the overall degree of forecast uncertainty), and the other incorporates
individual-specific heterogeneity in the degree of activism.
We have implemented this model by assuming that new MPC members
go with the general flow for a period of time (the first 3 meetings in our
case) before their individual views start getting expressed17. Thus, we can
use the votes in these three initial meetings to estimate µ and σ2, and votes
in the subsequent meetings to estimate the individual specific heterogeneity
parameters. We further assume that σ (yt) is uncorrelated with the other
regressors18. We first estimate the regression
4rit = α+ βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t + λ/.Zt−1 + uit
16Note that it is not necessary to assume that β∗σ and βσi are independently distributed,
but that they are jointly normally distributed.
17Some recent work (Sibert, 2003, for example) suggest that such an assumption
is justifiable from a theoretical point of view. This assumption also appears to be
justified in the present context of members of the Bank of England MPC. The first
vote against the motion for the 19 MPC members have been in meeting number
(1, 1, 2, 4, 4, 5, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 9+, 10, 18, 19, 20, 23, 74+) (+ denotes censored to the right).
Further, none of the 19 members have proposed an interest rate lower than the consensus
decision within the first 3 meetings.
18This is not an unreasonable assumption; the squared multiple correlation coefficient of
σ (yt+12) on all the other regressors is 0.336 and that on the two expected output variables
is only 0.054, while the correlation coefficient between σ (yt+12) and Eyt+12 is only −0.096.
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(using a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator) and use the computed resid-
uals to construct buit/σ (yt+12)19. Finally, we compare the means in an analysis
of variance (ANOVA) framework, after taking account of the differences in
variance for different levels of the design variable (in this case, one for each
member and a common effect corresponding to β∗σ). In this way, we can
identify significant contrasts (difference in means) between µ and the µi’s,
and between different µi’s, while allowing the variances of the heterogeneity
term to differ across the members.
3.5 A random coefficients model
The random effects model in the previous subsection has the limitation that
the restriction on the magnitudes of the random effect means (µ and µi’s) de-
pends on the design through n and the ni’s. This limitation can be overcome
by considering the following random coefficients model:
4rit = α+ βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+λ/.Zt−1 + βσ,it.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
+ εit, (26)
βσ,it are random coefficients independent of each other and of εit,
βσ,it v N
¡
µi, σ
2
i
¢
, εit v N
¡
0, σ2
¢
.
Under the interval regression framework considered earlier, we first esti-
mate the slope-heterogeneity fixed effects model:
4rit = α+ βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+λ/.Zt−1 + βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
+ εit.
Now, if we can estimate the regression residuals, bεit, the significance of
differences in means (contrasts) can be tested, using
bβσ,it = bεitσ (yt+12) + bβσi
as a pseudo-sample from the distribution of βσ,it. In our application, the
residuals cannot be directly obtained, since the response variable is censored.
19Since rit and 4rit are not directly available, we use buit = rit,obs− brit as an estimator,
where brit is obtained using the estimates obtained from the above regression. This con-
struction of pseudo realisations of buit would be asymptotically valid if the widths of the
censoring windows reduces to zero as n −→∞.
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However, one can either use bεit = rit,obs−brit as pseudo-estimates (as earlier),
or bootstrap from the distribution of the εit, and then use this sample to
evaluate the contrasts. This would constitute another way to identify sig-
nificant contrasts between different µi’s, while allowing the variances of the
heterogeneity term to differ across the members.
4 Results
We estimate the fixed effects models (Equations 23 and 24) and the ran-
dom effects model (Equation 25); estimates of the random coefficients model
(Equation 26) give results similar to the random effects model, and are not
presented here.
4.1 Majority decisions of the MPC
Table 2 presents parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for the
estimated model for majority MPC interest rate decisions. These are the
change in interest rates that are actually implemented. Results using OLS
and interval regression are presented here; the implications of estimates of a
multinomial logit model are similar.
It is clear that expected inflation and expected output matter for the
interest rate decision, with currently observed inflation and output playing
no role. This confirms the assertion of Section 2 that the Bank of England
follows an inflation forecast regime. It is also noticeable that movements in
the stock market play a significant role. The coefficients on unemployment,
house price inflation and the exchange rate have the right sign but are not
significant. The impact of output uncertainty is negative, but not significant.
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TABLE 2: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Majority MPC Interest Rate Decisions
Variables Ordinary Interval
Least Squares Regression
πt 0.012 (0.808) 0.031 (0.590)
πt+4|t 0.069 (0.048)∗ 0.081 (0.031)∗
yt 0.001 (0.977) 0.043 (0.369)
yt+1|t 0.145 (0.004)∗∗ 0.200 (0.000)∗∗
4ut -0.083 (0.479) -0.040 (0.755)
Phsg,t 1.009 (0.123) 1.040 (0.184)
PFTSE,t 0.307 (0.112) 0.742 (0.000)∗∗
Pexch,t 0.005 (0.191) 0.005 (0.162)
σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
-0.504 (0.378) -0.355 (0.587)
constant -0.273 (0.653) -0.714 (0.287)
Number of meetings 80 80
Goodness of fit F (9, 70) = 5.75 Wald χ2(9) = 219.56
Prob. > F = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000
R2 = 0.5062 Log pseudo-likelihood
= −37.1674
1. p-values in parentheses.
2. ∗∗,∗ ,+: Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.
4.2 Decisions of individual members with fixed effects
heterogeneity
Table 3 presents interval regression estimates and goodness-of-fit measures
for the fixed effects model of MPC members’ interest rate decisions. In this
case we are exploiting the extra information that is provided by the published
voting records of each of the Committee members. In addition to a model
where votes of individual MPC members reveal their own (heterogeneous)
types, we also estimate a model where the members belong to two types,
depending on whether they are internal members (from the Bank of England)
or external MPC members.
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TABLE 3: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MPC Members’ Interest Rate Decisions
Variables Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity: No
Indiv. members Int. vs. Ext. heterogeneity
πt -0.023 (0.349) -0.018 (0.460) -0.019 (0.460)
πt+4|t 0.092 (0.000)∗∗ 0.088 (0.000)∗∗ 0.088 (0.000)∗∗
yt -0.000 (0.991) -0.009 (0.585) -0.012 (0.506)
yt+1|t 0.205 (0.000)∗∗ 0.202 (0.000)∗∗ 0.198 (0.000)∗∗
4ut -0.156 (0.001)∗∗ -0.160 (0.001)∗∗ -0.161 (0.001)∗∗
Phsg,t 1.570 (0.000)∗∗ 1.870 (0.000)∗∗ 1.869 (0.000)∗∗
PFTSE,t 0.650 (0.000)∗∗ 0.686 (0.000)∗∗ 0.690 (0.000)∗∗
Pexch,t 0.007 (0.000)∗∗ 0.006 (0.000)∗∗ 0.006 (0.000)∗∗
σ (yt) -0.286 (0.230)
— × Allsopp -0.218 (0.363)
— × Barker -0.140 (0.564)
— × Bean -0.140 (0.562)
— × Bell -0.194 (0.431)
— × Budd -0.088 (0.711)
— × Buiter -0.161 (0.504)
— × Clementi -0.146 (0.542)
— × George -0.152 (0.526)
— × Goodhart -0.147 (0.540)
— × Julius -0.278 (0.241)
— × King -0.107 (0.652)
— × Lambert -0.174 (0.507)
— × Large -0.052 (0.830)
— × Lomax -0.112 (0.665)
— × Nickell -0.153 (0.526)
— × Plenderleith -0.159 (0.504)
— × Tucker -0.074 (0.763)
— × Vickers -0.113 (0.633)
— × Wadhwani -0.263 (0.269)
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TABLE 3 Contd.: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MPC Members’ Interest Rate Decisions
Variables Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity: No
Indiv. members Int. vs. Ext. heterogeneity
— × INTERNAL -0.251 (0.286)
— × EXTERNAL -0.318 (0.178)
constant -0.848 (0.001)∗∗ -0.737 (0.004)∗∗ -0.718 (0.006)∗∗
No. of member-meetings 696 696 696
Goodness of fit: Wald χ2 χ2(27) = 1384.87 χ2(10) = 1165.54 χ2(9) = 1080.18
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log pseudo-likelihood −494.5954 −517.6366 −534.0035
1. p-values in parentheses.
2. ∗∗,∗ ,+: Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.
3. Joint significance of the 19 individual member heterogeneity terms (LRT):−2. lnL =
78.816, 19 d.f., p-value 0.000.
4. Joint significance of the INTERNAL and EXTERNAL heterogeneity terms (LRT):
−2. lnL = 32.734, 2 d.f., p-value 0.000.
The broad conclusions from the model are similar to those for the overall
decisions of the MPC. However, we now find that developments in asset
markets do have a significant role to play in monetary policymaking. Though
none of the heterogeneity coefficients are individually significant, they are
jointly significant. The signs of the heterogeneity parameters are in the
direction of our a priori belief.
4.3 Decisions of individual members with random ef-
fects heterogeneity
The fixed effects estimates obtained in the previous subsection were not en-
tirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, none of the estimated heterogeneity
coefficients were significant at the 10 percent level, and second, this setup
does not allow us to explore individual specific heterogeneity after control-
ling for the “activism” apparent in some MPC members. Further, these two
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issues may indeed be related; while the lack of significance may be due to a
lower sample size, we would like to control for the differences in variance in a
random effects framework to have a closer look at the contrasts (differences
in mean responses). Table 4 reports estimates of our random effects model.
TABLE 4: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MPC Members’ Interest Rate Decisions — Random Effects
Variables bµ+ bµi V ar (β∗σ + βσi)
Allsopp 0.1326-0.6936∗∗ 0.1322
Barker 0.1326-0.1811 0.1492
Bean 0.1326-0.1071 0.1135
Bell 0.1326-0.7809 0.1163
Budd 0.1326+0.3991 0.1505
Buiter 0.1326+0.0582 0.2089
Clementi 0.1326+0.0974 0.1412
George 0.1326+0.0029 0.1378
Goodhart 0.1326+0.2002 0.1782
Julius 0.1326-0.6655∗∗ 0.1392
King 0.1326+0.2764 0.1450
Lambert 0.1326+0.0000 0.1526
Large 0.1326+0.3000 0.1365
Lomax 0.1326+0.0000 0.1079
Nickell 0.1326-0.2393 0.1657
Plenderleith 0.1326+0.0700 0.1450
Tucker 0.1326+0.1295 0.1069
Vickers 0.1326+0.2731 0.1554
Wadhwani 0.1326-0.6711∗ 0.1492
1. ∗∗,∗ ,+: Significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.
2. The estimates do not explicitly assume independence of β∗σ and βσi.
3. Other significant contrasts are: µKing − µAllsopp : 0.8938∗∗, µKing − µBell :
1.0275+, µKing−µJulius : 0.9362∗∗, µKing−µWadhwani : 0.9342∗∗,and µClementi−
µJulius : 0.7529
∗.
The estimates capture several of the interesting features of heterogeneity
discussed earlier. There are several significant contrasts, both with respect
to the typical average response of monetary policy µ and between member-
specific average responses (µi’s), and that the estimates reflect the expected
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Figure 3: Interest rates, predicted and actual (Based on Table 2)
direction of these contrasts. The degree of “activism” in any member is
reflected in the estimated variance of β∗σ + βσi. For example, Willem Buiter
is the most activist of all MPC members, but he did not have a particular
bias in favour of lower or higher interest rates on average. By contrast,
DeAnne Julius had a significant bias in favour of lower interest rates along
with Christopher Allsopp, but they were not more activist than the average.
Charlie Bean stands out as being both close on average to the actual MPC
decision and the least activist. Thus, this appears to be a reasonable model
of monetary policy decision-making in the presence of uncertainty.
4.4 Forecast performance of the estimated models
The comparison of actuals and (in sample) predicted decisions of the MPC, in
terms of level of the base rate and interest rate changes are shown in Figures
3 and 4 respectively. These predictions based on estimates in Table 2, ie.,
they do not incorporate heterogeneity in the decisions of the individual MPC
members. The last five months in each of the figures are out-of-sample, and
represent forecast performance of the models.
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Figure 4: Interest rate changes, predicted and actual (Based on Table 2)
Figure 3 indicates good conformity between the model predictions and
the actual level of the base rate. Figure 4 indicates that monetary policy
decisions follow the direction predicted by our model, while at the same
time indicating a degree of cautiousness in policy. To explore whether such
policy cautiousness may be reflected in the heterogeneity of the individual
MPC members’ decisions, we use the model with fixed effects heterogeneity
to predict the decisions of individual members (and consequently consensus
decisions of the committee) for the first five months of 2004. These out-of-
sample predictions are summarised in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 6 also presents MPC committee predictions for our estimated ran-
dom effects model. These predictions are obtained using the Poisson subnor-
mal approximation to the binomial distribution with different probabilities
for different independent draws (Johnson and Kotz, 1969). The first half of
2004 represents a period of high upward pressure on interest rates. This is
reflected fairly well in the predictions of MPC decisions generated through
the estimated models.
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TABLE 5: Predictions of MPC Members’ Decisions
(January to May, 2004)
January 2004
Actual: 0.00 Actual: 0.25
Predicted: 0.00 5 0 5
Predicted: 0.25 3 1 4
8 1 9
February 2004
Actual: 0.00 Actual: 0.25
Predicted: 0.00 0 2 2
Predicted: 0.25 0 7 7
0 9 9
March 2004
Actual: 0.00 Actual: 0.25
Predicted: 0.00 0 0 0
Predicted: 0.25 or higher 9 0 9
9 0 9
April 2004
Actual: 0.00 Actual: 0.25
Predicted: 0.00 0 0 0
Predicted: 0.25 or higher 8 1 9
8 1 9
May 2004
Actual: 0.00 Actual: 0.25
Predicted: 0.00 0 0 0
Predicted: 0.25 or higher 0 9 9
0 9 9
TABLE 6: Predictions of MPC Consensus Decisions
Meeting Actual Fixed Effects Rdm. Eff. (pred. prob.)
(predicted) Lower No change Raise
Jan. 2004 0.00 0.00 0.083 0.001 0.907
Feb. 2004 0.25 0.25 0.040 0.004 0.956
Mar. 2004 0.00 0.25 0.000 0.000 1.000
Apr. 2004 0.00 0.25 0.000 0.000 1.000
May 2004 0.25 0.25 0.000 0.000 1.000
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the conduct of UK monetary policy from
1997. Since then the Bank of England has had operational independence
and decisions on interest rates made by the majority verdict of a Monetary
Policy Committee. An enormous amount of information is provided about
the data made available to the MPC and the decisions on interest rates
decided upon by individual members. We find that an inflation forecast
regime best describes what the MPC does but we also find an important role
for developments in foreign exchange, equity and housing markets, once we
exploit the extra information that is available in the individual voting records
of MPC members. A role can also be found for unemployment. It is an open
question whether our ability to detect a role for variables other than inflation
and output is due to heterogeneity across the members of the MPC. In other
words individual members may attach some importance to developments in
asset markets and reflect these in an individual decision, which does not get
carried through to the collective decision.
We find evidence of heterogeneity in the way uncertainty about future lev-
els of output and output gap affect the interest rate decisions of individual
MPC members. This heterogeneity is reflected in the consensus decisions of
the MPC. Further, information about the voting intentions of MPC members
can be exploited for forecasting. This suggests that transparency and pre-
dictability are best served by the publication of voting records of individual
members.
Our estimated models predict the stance of monetary policy in the Bank
of England fairly well. It has been suggested in the literature that past
monetary policy decisions (and, voting behaviour in past meetings) contain
information about future changes in interest rates (Cobham, 2003; Gerlach-
Kristen, 2004). We have not taken these issues into account in our models,
and these seem to affect our predictions somewhat.
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